I. INTRODUCTION
After entering the twenty-first Century, the sustainable development of the world has attracted more and more people's attention. Kleindorfer et al. [1] use the term 'sustainability' to include closed-loop supply chains, environmental management, and provide a broad perspective on triple bottom line (3BL) thinking, integrating profit, people, and the planet into the culture, strategy, and operations of companies.
The closed-loop supply chain includes the collection and value recovery of end of life (EOL) products, besides production and sales of products. It achieves the value recovery of EOL products through remanufacturing and reduces the adverse impact of the supply chain activities on the environment. Remanufactured products are usually considered more environment-friendly than new products, because they capture the residual value of waste products, and save about 80% of energy and materials [2] . More and more governments encourage enterprises to remanufacture. Studies have shown that remanufactured product achieves the same performance and quality as new product does [3] . However, the price of remanufactured products is usually less than 30%∼40% of that of new products, but the cost of remanufactured products is only 40%∼65% of that of new products [4] . As substitutes for new products, remanufactured products are more and more popular.
Environmental challenges are pushing governments to find ways to reduce environmental damage and minimize harm to economic growth. Governments have a range of tools for environmental management, including innovation policies, environmental subsidies and environmental taxes.
In particular, environmental taxes are key parts of these toolkits. They are designed to internalize environmental costs and provide economic incentives for people and businesses to promote ecological sustainable activities. Four subsets of environmental taxes are distinguished: energy taxes, transport taxes, pollution taxes and resources taxes. For new and remanufactured products, the applicable conditions of different environmental taxes are not the same. In order to collect and remanufacture more used products, some environmental taxes are not applicable to remanufactured products, such as the China WEEE Fund [5] , [6] . Although remanufacturing reduces consumptions of energy and raw materials, it still causes environmental damages in the process of raw materials extraction, production, use, recycling and disposal. Therefore, some environmental taxes are applicable to remanufactured products, such as the carbon tax [7] - [9] . So far, whether or not imposing the environmental tax on remanufactured products has not been fully studied. There is no environmental tax which makes clear provisions of the environmental requirements of remanufactured products. Thus, the first objective of this paper is to elaborate whether or not remanufactured products should be taxed.
3BL is an approach to measure the success of an organization's activities which considers the organization's social and environmental performance in addition to the traditional financial performance [10] . Thus, we judge whether an environmental policy is beneficial to the world or the enterprise according to the 3BL thinking. At present, environmentalists have called for more stringent environmental policies on remanufactured products for better environmental performance. However, besides environmental performance, financial performance and social performance should also be paid attention to in the context of the 3BL thinking. Therefore, it is worthwhile discussing whether incorporating taxes on remanufactured products can make the world better in the context of the 3BL thinking. In particular, the situation in which the world gets worse after incorporating tax on remanufactured products has attracted the attention of governments and the enterprises. Thus, the second objective of this paper is to analyze the effect of incorporating tax on remanufactured products from the perspective of 3BL and explore the situation in which incorporating the taxation on remanufactured products makes the world worse.
We address the aforementioned objectives by seeking the answers to the following questions: (1) Tax policy usually inhibits the production behavior of the manufacturer. Therefore, the first question discussed in this paper is whether incorporating the tax on remanufactured products will hinder the production behavior of the manufacturer. ( 2) The government expects to realize a better environmental goal by incorporating the tax on remanufactured products. The second question in this paper is whether incorporating the tax on remanufactured products will improve environmental performance. ( 3) It is not comprehensive to evaluate the effectiveness of environmental policy merely by using single dimension, such as environmental performance. According to 3BL thinking, the third question in this paper is whether incorporating the tax on remanufactured products will make the world better from the point of view of economy, environment and social welfare.
In order to solve the above questions, we construct a leader-follower Stackelberg game model. The government is a leader with welfare-maximization and the manufacturer is a follower with profit-maximization. We examine two different cases: (1) the case without the tax on remanufactured products; and (2) the case with the tax on remanufactured products. For the former which is a benchmark, the government merely imposes environmental tax on new products. The government does not impose the tax on the remanufactured products to encourage remanufacturing. For the latter, the government simultaneously imposes environmental tax on new and remanufactured products for a better environmental goal. In two cases, the firm offers a mixed product line including new and remanufactured products and the only difference is whether or not to impose the tax on remanufactured products. To assess the impact of incorporating the tax on remanufactured products on production decision, we compare the optimal quantities of new and remanufactured products under two cases. To comprehend the economic and environmental impacts of incorporating the tax on remanufactured products, we compare economic profit and environmental impact under two cases, respectively. To help the government formulate the optimal tax policy and determine the optimal tax price, we compare the optimal social welfare under two cases.
The remainder of this paper is divided into seven sections. Section 2 shows a literature review. Section 3 describes research questions, research hypotheses and model notations in detail. Two nonlinear constrained mathematical problems are modeled and solved in section 4. Section 5 compares two different cases from the perspectives of production decision, economic profit and environmental impact, respectively. Section 6 demonstrates the optimal tax price and analyzes whether or not to incorporate the tax on remanufactured products from the point of view of welfare-maximization. At last, conclusions and future studies are discussed.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature streams related to this paper mainly include two aspects: sustainable supply chain and the impact of environmental regulation.
In the past few decades, Sustainable supply chain has been further studied and developed which integrates environmental concerns and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) into the enterprises [11] . More and more consumers and governments are forcing companies to strike a balance between profitability and sustainability [12] . Kleindorfer et al. [1] identify that the future of people and the future of Planet Earth are also as important as the profits and profitability for the long-term success of enterprises. Fauzi et al. [13] propose the concept of 3BL as the evaluation criteria of sustainable corporate performance and show that 3BL may be seen as a function of time and context. VOLUME 7, 2019 Closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) is considered as a strategic framework to realize corporate sustainability whilst further expanding the scope of value creation of discarded products [14] . The scope of value creation of discarded products in the context of CLSC includes remanufacturing, reuse, recycling and refurbishing. Remanufacturing is a most effective process of value recovery which improves the performance of EOL products to match that of new products. A lot of literature study on remanufacturing in the sight of operations management including pricing [15] , market segmentation [16] , cannibalization [17] , competition [18] , power structure [19] and product life cycle [20] . Debo et al. [21] explore the effects of remanufacturability level and capacity profile on economic profit under the monopoly environment. Ferrer and Swaminathan [22] present a monopoly manufacturer model with heterogeneous consumers and discuss the optimal remanufacturing and pricing strategy in two periods, multi periods and infinite horizons. Subramanian et al. [23] analyze the effects of remanufacturing on component commonality decision and economic profit of OEM in single period. This paper also presents a single-period model instead of a twoperiod model, but this does not affect the research and analysis of core issues. Wang and Hazen [24] prove that consumer perceived value of remanufactured products is affected by quality knowledge, cost knowledge and green knowledge. This paper assumes that heterogeneous consumers distinguish new and remanufactured products in the light of green knowledge.
More and more countries hope to improve and solve severe environmental problems through environmental laws. Most laws emphasize on the internalization of environmental costs, harming the profitability of enterprises. The stream on the impact of environmental regulation on the profit has received scholars' attention. Hong and Ke [25] and Hong et al. [26] discuss recycling fund management for E-waste in Taiwan and analyze the impact of advanced recycling fees (ARFs) on the profits of supply chain memberships. Liu et al. [27] study the impact of three carbon emission regulations on remanufacturing and find that remanufacturers should aim to improve yield rate to maximize the profit irrespective of the implemented carbon emissions policy. Miao et al. [9] show that imposing carbon tax on all products increases the sales of remanufactured products, decreases demand for new products and damages economic profit. The aforementioned literature studies focus on regarding the economic profits as the decision target, neglecting the realization of environment target. Recently, more and more literature studies have followed the impact of environmental regulation on the environment. Esenduran et al. [28] use a life cycle analysis-based approach to model the environmental impact of monopoly manufacturer and analyze the effect of stricter take-back legislation on environmental performance. Esenduran et al. [29] introduce the competition between the manufacturer and the remanufacturer and show that more stringent targets do not imply more remanufacturing. Yuan et al. [30] employ the panel data of China's manufacturing industry during the period 2003-2013 and show that the level of current environmental regulation is not yet sufficient to promote the eco-efficiency. Besides exploring the impact of environmental regulation on economic profit and environment, 3BL thinking of sustainable supply chain focuses on the impact of environmental regulation on social welfare. Yenipazarli [8] considers the balance among economic, environmental and social benefits in order to study the impact of carbon tax on social welfare. Zhu et al. [31] compare two different incentive policies for remanufacturing and show that from the perspective of social welfare maximization, the choice of two policies depends on the social benefit of product donation. Sheu and Chen [32] construct a three-stage game-theoretic model to analyze the effect of financial intervention on green supply chain competition and find that financial intervention improves social welfare and chain-based profits.
Our work is distinguished from earlier studies as follows: (1) This paper compares two nonlinear constrained optimization problems and explores the impact of levers such as environmental awareness, internal cannibalization and tax intensity of remanufactured products on operations management. (2) This paper determines the optimal tax pricing of the government under the cases with and without the tax on remanufactured products. (3) This paper investigates the effect of incorporating the tax on remanufactured products on economy, environment and society from the perspective of 3BL and analyzes why incorporating the tax on remanufactured products does not make the world better. The research results of this paper serve as a guidance for regulator and firm to determine the environmental policy and formulate decision making, respectively.
III. MODEL DEPICTION AND ASSUMPTIONS
In this section, we introduce the assumptions and notations regarding product life cycle, consumer preference, cost structure, product environmental impact and decision-making process.
We consider a monopolist who faces the demand for new and remanufactured products in a single period. The single period that focuses on steady-state profits and facilitates analytical tractability is common in the literature on operations management [33] . We assume that used products can only be remanufactured once. ρ ∈ (0, 1) is denoted as collection rate, which captures possible constraints on the collection of cores [34] . Therefore, q r ≤ ρq n represents that at most only a proportion ρ of used products can be collected and remanufactured in a steady-state environment [35] . q n and q r denote the demand for new products and remanufactured products, respectively.
Similar to the established marketing literature [16] , [36] , we consider that consumers are heterogeneous, whose willingness-to-pay ν is uniformly distributed in [0, 1] . The market size is normalized to 1 [37] . Each consumer buys at most one unit in a single period [38] . Let p r and p n denote the price for new products and t remanufactured products, respectively. The consumer with willingness-to-pay ν gets 8544 VOLUME 7, 2019 a net utility u n = ν − p n from buying a new product. Taking into account the fact that consumers do not view remanufactured products as perfect substitutes and perceive them to be inferior quality, we assume that the consumer's perceived value of remanufactured products is αν, resulting in net utility u r = αν − p r . α ∈ (0, 1) represents the degree of acceptance of remanufactured products [39] . The stronger environmental awareness of consumers is, the higher the degree of acceptance of remanufactured products is [24] . Thus, α can also represent consumer's environmental awareness. If u n > u r and u n > 0, consumers choose to buy new products. If u r > u n and u r > 0, consumers choose to buy remanufactured products. The firm has two pricing strategies: (1) the high pricing strategy, namely p r > αp n . Here,
α , then u n > u r and u n > 0. As remanufactured products are overpriced, consumers only buy new products and demand function is q n = 1 − p n . (2) the low pricing strategy, namely p r < αp n . Here α . In order to ensure that new and remanufactured products are sold simultaneously in the market, the firm adopts the low pricing strategy. Therefore, the inverse functions of the new and remanufactured products under low pricing strategy are p n = 1 − q n − αq r and p r = α (1 − q n − q r ), respectively.
The unit cost of producing new product and remanufactured product is denoted by c n and c r , respectively. In our analysis, we assume c r < αc n , which ensures that the quantity of the remanufactured products is non-negative without government tax [36] . The government requires the manufacturer to assume the financial responsibility of the product recovery. This kind of financial responsibility is often internalized into the cost of production through taxation [40] . Thus, the environmental tax is another direct cost for the manufacturer. According to its environmental impact, the new product is charged a unit cost of environmental tax, denoted by t. For the remanufactured product, the government may choose whether or not to impose the tax on remanufactured products. If the government incorporates the tax on remanufactured products, the remanufactured product is charged a unit cost of environmental tax denoted by δt in terms of the relative environmental impact of the remanufactured product. For the government, δ indicates relative environmental impact of remanufactured product. Smaller δ indicates smaller environmental impact and lower tax intensity of remanufactured products.
The environmental impact of the product can be measured by a variety of methods. Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) is an approach that assesses a product's environmental impact over its entire life cycle from cradle to grave and considers various environmental impact criteria including energy consumption, non-renewable raw materials consumption, carbon emissions and so on [28] . According to LCA, we assume that the environmental impact of the unit new product is denoted by ξ , thus the environmental impact of the unit remanufactured product is denoted by δξ . For the manufacturer, δ ∈ (0, 1) indicates the degree of relative environmental impact of remanufactured product and 1 − δ captures the reduction of environmental impact by remanufactured product. Owing that ξ is an exogenous parameter, the value of parameter ξ does not affect conclusions. In order to simplify the calculation, we set ξ = 1 and assume that the total environmental impact is the linear increasing function of production output, which depends on the quantities of new and remanufactured products [41] . Therefore, when the manufacturer engages in remanufacturing, its total environmental impact is E = q n + δq r .
We present a Stackelberg game model between the government and the manufacturer. The government is the leader with welfare-maximization, and the manufacturer is the follower with profit-maximization. The decision-making process is as follows. First, the government determines whether or not to impose tax on remanufactured products and then sets optimal tax price for the cases without and with tax on remanufactured products. Second, the manufacturer determines the optimal production decision for new and remanufactured products according to the tax policy. Then, the backward induction is applied to solve the problem. We first solve for the firm's optimal response to tax price for the cases without and with tax on remanufactured products. After given the firm's optimal response to tax price, we determine the optimal tax prices for the cases without and with tax on remanufactured products.
IV. MODEL FORMULATION AND SOLUTION
In this section, we examine the optimal pricing and quantity decisions of the manufacturer under two distinct cases. The manufacturer with profit-maximization determines the optimal quantities q n and q r . X denotes the profit of manufacturer under the case X (X = {RN , R}), where superscript RN and R indicate that the regulator imposes the tax only on new products and imposes the tax both on new and remanufactured products, respectively.
A. MANUFACTURER'S PRODUCTION DECISION: THE CASE WITHOUT THE TAX ON REMANUFACTURED PRODUCTS
In the case RN , the government requires the manufacturer to only undertake the environmental cost of new products and encourages remanufacturing for recycling discarded products. Thereby, the unit new product is charged unit environmental tax t. The quantity of remanufactured products is constrained by the sales of new products. Then the profitmaximizing function of the manufacturer subject to an availability constraint is as follows.
The case RN can be solved by Karush-KuhnTucker Optimization Theory. The tax price
denotes a piecewise point VOLUME 7, 2019 which determines that whether remanufacturing is unconstrained under the case RN . Proposition 1: In the case RN , the optimal production decisions for new and remanufactured products can be given by
otherwise, and the resulting optimal profit and environmental impact are
and
respectively.
Proof: See Appendix I. When tax price is low, namely t ≤ t RN , the quantity of remanufactured products is lower than the supply of remanufacturable returns, namely q r < ρq n . As the tax price increases, the quantity of new products decreases, whereas the quantity of remanufactured products increases. More significantly, economic profit of the manufacturer becomes worse as tax price increases. This is because the net profit resulting from increased remanufactured products is lower than the net loss resulting from decreased new products. When tax price is high, namely t > t RN , the quantity of remanufactured products is exactly equal to the supply of remanufacturable returns, namely q r = ρq n . As the tax price increases, the quantities of remanufactured and new products both decrease and economic profit of the manufacturer becomes worse.
No matter how the government sets up the tax price, the environmental impact always improves as the tax price increases. Thus, when the tax price meets certain conditions, economic and environmental benefits of the manufacture both improve better. When the tax price is too high, improved environmental impact is at the expense of economic profit.
Proposition 2: In the case RN , the effective tax regulation
In order to guarantee that the tax level point t RN has the economic significance, ρ > αc n −c r α(1−α−c n +c r ) = ρ * makes t RN > 0, suggesting that the collection rate exists a minimum lower threshold point to ensure that the inactive and active constraint conditions both exist. In the case RN , if ρ < ρ * , equilibrium solution only exists in the active constraint condition, namely q r = ρq n . At this time, the available constraint limits decision-making of remanufacturing and the efficiency of recycling is low.
B. MANUFACTURER'S PRODUCTION DECISION: THE CASE WITH THE TAX ON REMANUFACTURED PRODUCTS
In the case R, the government requires the manufacturer to undertake the environmental cost of new and remanufactured products for better environmental impact. The new product is charged unit environmental tax t. Considering the relative environmental impact of a unit remanufactured product, remanufactured product is charged unit environmental tax δt. The quantity of remanufactured products is constrained by the sales of new products. Then the profit-maximizing function of the manufacturer subject to an available constraint is as follows.
The case R also can be solved by Karush-KuhnTucker Optimization Theory. The tax level t R =
denotes a piecewise point which determines whether remanufacturing is unconstrained under the case R.
Proposition 3:
In the case R, the optimal production decisions for new and remanufactured products can be given by
and the resulting optimal profit and environmental impact are
respectively.
Proof: See Appendix III. When tax price is low, namely t ≤ t R , the quantity of remanufactured products is lower than the supply of remanufacturable returns, namely q r < ρq n . As the tax price increases, the quantity of new products decreases and economic profit of manufacturer becomes worse. It is noteworthy that the effect of the tax price on the quantity of remanufactured products depends on the degree of relative environmental impact of the remanufactured product δ and the degree of acceptance of the remanufactured product α. When α > δ, the quantity of remanufactured products increases as the tax price increases, otherwise, decreases. On one hand, higher α indicates higher consumer environmental awareness, and then increases the demand for remanufactured products. On the other hand, imposing the tax on remanufactured products reduces the demand for remanufactured products. As a result, the trade-off between α and δ determines the effect of tax price on the quantity of the remanufactured product. If α = δ, the quantity of the remanufactured product is not affected by the tax price. The effect of the parameter α on increased remanufactured products is same as that of the parameter δ on decreased remanufactured products When tax price is high, namely t > t R , the quantity of remanufactured products is exactly equal to the supply of remanufacturable returns, namely q r = ρq n . The quantities of new and remanufactured products decrease as the tax price increases. The economic profit gets worse and the environmental impact gets better as the tax price increases.
Proposition 4:
In the case R, the effective tax regulation region by government is t
Here,
. Proof: See Appendix IV. In order to ensure that the tax level point t R has economic significance, δ < αρ+α αρ+1 makes t R > 0 and δ < α−c r 1−c n = δ * makes t R < t U −R . Then δ < δ * suggests that the relative environmental impact of the remanufactured product exists an upper threshold point depending on profitability ratio of new and remanufactured products to ensure that the inactive and active constraint conditions both exist. In fact, remanufacturing usually brings a reduction of 60% in energy consumption, 75% in waste and 70% in carbon emissions [42] . When δ * ≤ δ < αρ+α αρ+1 , the tax price difference between remanufactured and new products is small and equilibrium solution only exists with the inactive constraint condition in t ∈ [0, t U −R ). Remanufacturing cost resulted from tax burden is high and remanufacturing is unconstrained. When δ ≥ αρ+α αρ+1 , t R < 0 conflicts with t R > t U −R , and thus no equilibrium solution exists.
According to Proposition 2 and Proposition 4, comparisons of the effective tax regulation regions under two distinct cases are as shown in Figure 1 . The tax region with inactive constraint condition in the case R completely covers that with inactive constraint condition in the case RN . Meanwhile, the tax region with active constraint condition in the case RN completely covers that with active constraint condition in the case R. It is suggested that incorporating the tax on remanufactured products leads to the expansion of adjustable tax region with inactive constraint condition. This is because weakened cannibalization increases the demand for new products. The shrink of adjustable tax region with active constraint condition reflects that double taxation reduces the manufacturer's willingness to remanufacture. In general, incorporating the tax on remanufactured products causes the shrink of adjustable tax region. 
V. MODEL ANALYZING
In order to better solve the above problems, we determine the tax price region t ∈ [0, t U −R ) where two cases with the active and inactive constraint conditions both coexist. At this moment, ρ > ρ * and δ < δ * . Since both cases exist piecewise functions, we can divide them into three intervals on the basis of piecewise points, which are 0 ≤ t < t RN , t RN ≤ t ≤ t R and t R < t < t U −R , respectively, as shown in Figure 1 . Next, take the case RN as a benchmark, we can analyze the impact of incorporating the tax on the remanufactured products on the production decision, economic profit and environmental impact, respectively. VOLUME 7, 2019 TABLE 2. The effects of incorporating the tax on remanufactured products on q n (t ) and q r (t ).
A. THE EFFECT OF INCORPORATING THE TAX ON THE REMANUFACTURED PRODUCTS ON PRODUCTION DECISION
Let q n (t) = q R * n (t)−q RN * n (t) and q r (t) = q R * r (t)−q RN * r (t) represent incremental quantities of new and remanufactured products after incorporating the tax on remanufactured products, respectively. In this paper, the signs +, −, ↑ and ↓ indicate that the increment is positive, the increment is negative, the increment increases monotonically in t and the increment decreases monotonically in t, respectively.
Proposition 5: The effects of the tax price on incremental quantities q n (t) and q r (t) after incorporating the tax on remanufactured products are shown in Table 2 and illustrated in Figure 2 As are seen in Figure 2 and Figure 3 . When the tax price is low, namely t ∈ [0, t RN ), the incremental quantity of new product is positive and increases in t. In contrast, the incremental quantity of remanufactured product is negative and decreases in t. Hence, incorporating the tax on remanufactured product results in the expansion of demand for the new product and the shrink of demand for the remanufactured product. The expansion of demand for the new product is because incorporating the tax on remanufactured products weakens the cannibalization effect on demand for the new product. Although imposing the tax on new product results in decreasing demand for new product, weakened cannibalization effect has an even stronger impact on the expansion of demand for the new product.
Note that the change of the quantity of the new product is less than that of the remanufactured product after incorporating the tax on remanufactured products. Because the degree of acceptance of the remanufactured product is lower, the remanufactured product is more easily affected by the tax price than the new product under the low tax price. When the tax price is moderate, namely t ∈ [t RN , t R ], q n (t) exists only one tax price root t a . For the new product, if the tax price is lower than t a , incorporating the tax on remanufactured products results in increasing demand for new product, otherwise decreasing demand for new product. In addition, the incremental quantity of new product decreases in t ∈ [t RN , t R ]. Thereby, t a is a trade-off tax price point between the expansion of the new product as a result of tax on remanufactured products and the shrink of the new product as a result of tax on new products. For the remanufactured product, the incremental quantity of remanufactured product is negative. Note that the effect of tax price on the incremental quantity of remanufactured product depends on the cost of the remanufactured product c r and the degree of relative environmental impact of the remanufactured product δ.
When the cost of the remanufactured product is high enough, namely c r ≥ c r * , the negative incremental quantity of remanufactured product increases in t. Figure 3 illustrates this conclusion. Note that, if δ < α, consumers consider that the remanufactured product is environmental-friendly enough, and the quantity of the remanufactured product in the case R increases in t ∈ [t RN , t R ] and the quantity of the remanufactured product in the case RN decreases in t ∈ [t RN , t R ]. Thereby, q r (t) increases in t ∈ [t RN , t R ]. If α ≤ δ < δ * , although consumers consider that remanufactured product is not environmental-friendly, the change of the quantity of the remanufactured product in the case R is lower than that in the case RN as the tax price increases in t ∈ [t RN , t R ]. Thereby,
When the cost of the remanufactured product is low enough, namely c r < c r * , the effect of tax price on the incremental quantity of remanufactured product also depends on δ. As is seen in Figure 2 (a), if δ ≤ δ a , the negative incremental quantity of remanufactured product increases in t. Because α < δ a , the situation in δ ∈ (0, δ a ] is the same as above. As is seen in Figure 2(b) , if δ a < δ < δ * , the negative incremental quantity of remanufactured product decreases in t. At the moment, remanufactured product is very unfriendly, the change of the quantity of the remanufactured product in the case R is higher than that in the case RN as the tax price increases in t ∈ [t RN , t R ]. Thereby, q r (t) decreases in t ∈ [t RN , t R ]. When the tax price is high, namely t ∈ (t R , t U −R ), the quantities of new and remanufactured products both decrease in t. For the new product, weakened cannibalization as a result of incorporating the tax on remanufactured products has a negligible impact on the expansion of demand for the new product under high tax price. Therefore, the demand for the new product decreases in t. Note that the change of the quantity of the remanufactured product is lower than that of the new product after incorporating the tax on remanufactured products. This is because under the high tax price, the quantity of the new product decreases faster and the decline of the quantity of the remanufactured product is lower than that of the new product due to the limited collection rate of cores.
B. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF INCORPORATING THE TAX ON REMANUFACTURED PRODUCTS

Let
(t) = R * (t) − RN * (t) denote the optimal incremental profit after incorporating the tax on remanufactured products.
Proposition 6: The effect of the tax price on incremental profit is shown in Table 3 and illustrated in Figure 4 .
Proof: See Appendix VI. Although incorporating the tax on remanufactured products leads to the worse economic profit of the manufacturer in the whole tax price region, the effects of tax price on incremental profit in different intervals are different.
(t) is a decreasing concave function of t ∈ (0, t RN ). In addition, although (t) is strictly convex in t ∈ [t RN , t R ] and t ∈ (t R , t U −R ), the monotonicities of (t) in t ∈ [t RN , t R ] and t ∈ (t R , t U −R ) are different, which depends on the degree of relative environmental impact of the remanufactured product δ. If δ ∈ (0, δ b ), (t) = 0 has only one root t c in t ∈ (t R , t U −R ).
(
t) decreases in t ∈ [t RN , t c ) and increases in t ∈ (t c , t U −R
(t) decreases in t ∈ [t RN , t b ) and increases in t ∈ (t b , t U −R ). After incorporating the tax on remanufactured products, although initially the new product slightly increases in t ∈ [0, t RN ), the remanufactured product significantly decreases in t ∈ [0, t RN ). Therefore, the profit of the manufacturer decreases gently in t ∈ [0, t RN ). Subsequently, new and remanufactured products both decrease and the profit of the manufacturer decreases significantly in t. When the tax price reaches a certain level, the increasing remanufacturing cost resulted from the tax burden and the collection rate lead to a very limited number of the remanufactured product. Thereby, the decline of the remanufactured product has a trivial impact on the profit of the manufacturer and the negative incremental profit gradually increases as the tax price increases.
C. THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF INCORPORATING THE TAX ON REMANUFACTURED PRODUCTS
Let E(t) = E R * (t) − E RN * (t) represent the optimal incremental environmental impact after incorporating the tax on remanufactured products.
Proposition 7: The effect of the tax price on incremental environmental impact E(t) is shown in Table 4 and illustrated in Figure 5 . Proof: See Appendix VII. Figure 5 depicts the function E(t) of the variable t. The parameter values are same as those in Proposition 6. Proposition 7 demonstrates that the environmental impact of incorporating the tax on remanufactured products is not necessarily improved. On one hand, the incremental environmental impact primarily relies on the level of the tax price; on the other hand, it depends on the trade-off between the degree of acceptance of the remanufactured product α and the degree of relative environmental impact of the remanufactured product δ.
TABLE 4. The effect of incorporating the tax on remanufactured products on E (t ).
When the tax price is low, namely t ∈ [0, t RN ), the incremental environmental impact is E(t) = δt(α−δ) 2(1−α)α , which is consisted of the positive environmental impact of new product δt 2−2α and the negative environmental impact of the remanufactured product − δ 2 t 2(1−α)α . It is easy to see that under low tax price, incorporating the tax on remanufactured products increases the demand for new product resulting in bad environmental impact and decreases the demand for remanufactured product resulting in good environmental impact. When α − δ > 0, E(t) > 0 demonstrates that incorporating the tax on remanufactured products results in worse environmental impact. That is because the environmental impact as a result of increased demand for the new product is stronger than that as a result of decreased demand for the remanufactured product. α − δ > 0 implies that consumers consider remanufactured product environment-friendly enough. At the moment, incorporating tax on remanufactured product leads to a ''lose-lose'' situation where environmental impact and economic profit both get worse. In other words, under low tax price, if consumers consider that remanufactured product is environmental friendly, there is no doubt that incorporating the tax on remanufactured products is unnecessary. When α −δ < 0, E(t) < 0 demonstrates that incorporating the tax on remanufactured products results in better environmental impact. That is because the environmental impact as a result of increased demand for the new product is weaker than that as a result of decreased demand for the remanufactured product. α − δ < 0 implies that consumers consider remanufactured product not environment-friendly enough. At the moment, incorporating tax on remanufactured product leads to a ''win-lose'' situation where environmental impact gets better and economic profit gets worse. This has achieved environmental expectation for the government by setting up the environmental tax on remanufactured products. When α − δ = 0, E(t) = 0 demonstrates that incorporating the tax on remanufactured products does not change the environmental impact under the low tax price.
When the tax price is moderate, namely t ∈ [t RN , t R ], the environmental impact of incorporating the tax on remanufactured products still depends on the trade-off between α and δ. When α − δ ≤ 0, E(t) < 0 demonstrates that incorporating the tax on remanufactured products results in better environmental impact. When α − δ > 0, E(t) has only one root t d in t ∈ [t RN , t R ] and t d < t a . t d is a balance point between the negative environmental impact of remanufactured product and the positive environmental impact of new product. Thus, the environmental impact of incorporating the tax on remanufactured products gets worse in t ∈ [t RN , t d ) and gets better in t ∈ (t d , t R ].
To sum up, compared with Proposition 5, under low-tax price policy, namely t ∈ [0, t d ), there is a probable condition where the environmental impact gets worse after incorporating the tax on remanufactured products.
When the tax price is high, namely t ∈ (t R , t U −R ), the environmental impact always gets better. This is because, under high-tax price policy, demands for new and remanufactured products decline significantly, thereby resulting in a better environmental impact.
VI. SOCIAL WELFARE
The tax price affects not only the manufacturer's profit and environmental impact but also the consumer surplus and government revenue. Thus, the government as a regulator should determine the optimal tax price to achieve the maximization of social welfare for balancing economy, environment and society. In this section, we construct a social welfare model consisted of the manufacturer's profit, environmental cost, consumer surplus and government revenue to investigate how incorporating the tax on remanufactured products affects the assessment of social welfare.
Let superscript i denote the case RN and R, respectively. Next, we construct social welfare functions SW i .
A. GOVERNMENT REVENUE G i (t )
The new and remanufactured products are charged the unit cost of environmental tax t and δt, respectively. The government spends the tax revenue in improving social welfare. The tax revenues are tq RN * n and tq R * n + δtq R * r in the case RN and R, respectively.
B. CONSUMER SURPLUS CS i (t )
Consumers obtain the surplus by purchasing new and remanufactured products. It is represented by
C. MANUFACTURER'S PROFIT i (t )
Manufacturer's profits in the cases RN and R are represented by equation (1) and (3), respectively. They are calculated as follows:
The new and remanufactured products both have environmental impacts in the process of production, consumption, recycling and disposal. To better describe the environmental impact of the product on social welfare, we convert the environmental impact into the monetary measurement. Unit environmental cost is denoted by e. The total environmental cost is VOLUME 7, 2019 calculated by ω(E i (t)) = eE i (t). Then the total environmental cost in the case i is as follows: ω(E i * (t)) = e(q i * n + δq i * r ). Combining the components G i (t), CS i (t), i (t) and ω(E i (t)), the total welfare function in the case i is as follows:
Let t i * denote the optimal tax price of government in the case i. SW i * = max (t) and SW R (t) have the similar function structure and nature, and exist the unique maximum tax price t RN * and t R * , respectively.
Proposition 9: If e ≤ e RN 1 , the optimal tax price of government in the case i is t i * = 0. If e RN 1 < e ≤ e R 1 , the optimal tax price of government in the case R is t R * = 0, but the optimal tax price of government in the case RN is t RN * , where
. Proof: See Appendix IX. Proposition 9 demonstrates that if the environmental cost is low enough, namely e ≤ e RN 1 , environmental hazard of the product is small enough. Then, the government gives up charging environmental tax. It is illustrated that the manufacturer's products meet the requirements of environmental standards of the government. When e RN 1 < e ≤ e R 1 , the government gives up the environmental tax in the case R and sets up the optimal tax price t RN * in the case RN . It is noted that incorporating the tax on remanufactured products results in increasing the initial threshold of taxable environmental cost. In other words, imposing the tax only on new products is stricter than that both on new and remanufactured products, so the former is more likely to be triggered.
Proposition 10: If e > max e 3 , e RN 4 , the optimal tax price is t RN * = t U −R in the case RN . If e > max e 3 , e R 4 , the optimal tax price is t R * = t U −R in the case R. Among, e 3 , e RN 4 , and e R 4 , as shown at the bottom of this page. Proof: See Appendix X. Proposition 10 presents a result: when the environmental cost of the product is too large, it means that the environmental hazard of the product is too serious, and then the government sets up the most stringent tax price. Under stringent tax strategy, the production activities of the manufacturer cannot gain profit and the products can be eliminated from the market.
According to Propositions 8, 9 and 10, the regulator with the goal of welfare-maximization makes a policy decision regarding whether or not to impose tax on remanufactured products. In the case R, the optimal tax price of the government is t R * , the optimal social welfare is denoted by SW R * = SW R (t R * ). In the case RN , the optimal tax price of the government is t RN * , the optimal social welfare is denoted by SW RN * = SW RN (t RN * ). Thereby, Proposition 11 is proposed.
Proposition 11: The government with the goal of welfaremaximization determines the optimal social welfare SW * = max{SW R * , SW RN * } and formulates the optimal tax policy. Then the optimal tax price is t * = arg max{SW R * , SW RN * }. Proposition 11 presents whether the government should impose the tax on remanufactured products depends on social welfare under two different cases. From the analysis of Proposition 8, the optimal tax price t NR * must come from the point set {t RN 1 , t RN 2 , 0, t RN , t U −R } in the case RN . Similarly, the optimal tax price t R * must come from the point set
We can compare function value of points according to Proposition 8 and determine the optimal social welfare values SW R * and SW RN * . If SW R * > SW RN * , the optimal social welfare is SW * = SW R * , thus the government should incorporate the environmental tax on remanufactured products. If SW R * ≤ SW RN * , the optimal social welfare is SW * = SW RN * , thus the government should impose the environmental tax only on new products.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Compared with new products, remanufactured products reduce raw materials and energy and bring better
.
8552 VOLUME 7, 2019 environmental benefits. Thus, some regulators often encourage manufacturers to remanufacture and give up imposing the environmental tax on remanufactured products. However, remanufactured products still bring environmental pollution. Thus, the other regulators also impose the environmental tax on remanufactured products to reduce environmental pollution. It is the government's concern about whether or not to impose the tax on remanufactured products. Based on the background of the tax on new products, this paper introduces the tax on remanufactured products and presents a leader-follower Stackelberg game model consisting of a welfare-maximizing government and a profit-maximizing manufacturer. We compare two distinct cases: (1) the case without the tax on remanufactured products; and (2) the case with the tax on remanufactured products. Our findings can be summarized as follows.
Incorporating the tax on remanufactured products reduces the manufacturer's willingness to remanufacture and leads to the shrink of the adjusted scope of the effective tax price. From the point of view of production, if the tax price is high, incorporating the tax on remanufactured products leads to a rapid decline of the production of new and remanufactured products, hampering the manufacturer's production behavior. If the tax price is low, incorporating the tax on remanufactured products can mitigate cannibalization of remanufactured products and increase the demand for new products.
From the point of view of economic profit and environmental impact, if the tax price is high enough, incorporating the tax on remanufactured products damages the economic profit of the manufacturer, but effectively improves the environmental impact, resulting in a ''lose-win'' situation. Therefore, the government incorporates the tax on remanufactured products to achieve the environmental goal, but the improved environment is at the expense of economic profit. If the tax price is low and consumers consider remanufactured product is environment-friendly enough, incorporating the tax on remanufactured products brings a ''lose-lose'' situation where the economic and environmental benefits of the manufacturer are simultaneously damaged. This warns regulators that there is no need to impose the tax on remanufactured products when the environmental awareness of consumers is strong enough under low-tax price. On the contrary, if consumers consider remanufactured products are not environment-friendly, incorporating the tax on remanufactured products leads to better environmental impact.
In order to fully understand the policy validity of incorporating the tax on remanufactured products, the government should use welfare-maximization as a criterion to determine whether or not to impose tax on remanufactured products. The cases RN and R exist the unique maximum tax price t RN * and t R * under the goal of welfare-maximization, respectively. Different environmental cost values of products affect the optimal tax price and the choice of tax policy. When the environmental cost of products is over-low, there is no need to impose the environmental tax. On the contrary, if the environmental cost of products is over-high, over-high tax price eliminates the product. It is noted that incorporating the tax on remanufactured products results in raising the initial threshold of taxable environmental cost. So taxing only on new products is stricter than that on both new and remanufactured products, manufacturer' products are more likely to trigger the former.
Although incorporating the tax on remanufactured products can bring better environmental impact in most conditions, it sacrifices economic profit of manufacturer. So the government deliberately designs subsidy schemes to improve the manufacturer's profit. Miao et al. [9] demonstrate welldesigned subsidy schemes can reduce the carbon emissions and not damage the manufacturer's profit. The subsidy scheme will be explored in the future study.
APPENDIX I
The Lagrangian is RN = (p n − c n − t) q n + (p r − c r )q r + λ(ρq n − q r ). The Hessian is negative definite, and thus the first-order conditions guarantee optimality.
Then, solving the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, At last, we can get RN * and E RN * . Proposition 1 can be proved..
APPENDIX II
Because t RN > 0, we can obtain 
APPENDIX III
The Lagrangian is R = (p n − c n − t) q n +(p r −c r −δt)q r + λ(ρq n − q r ). The Hessian is negative definite, and thus the first-order conditions guarantee optimality. Then, solving the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, and q R r = ρq R n . When λ = 0, we can VOLUME 7, 2019
and q R r = αc n −c r +αt−δt 2α (1−α) satisfying ρq n ≥ q r . At last, we can get R * and E R * . Proposition 3 can be proved.
APPENDIX IV
Because t RN > 0, t R > 0 must satisfy α (1 + ρ)−(1+αρ)δ > 0, namely δ < αρ+α αρ+1 . When t > t R , t < αρ−c n −ρc r +1 δρ+1 To sum up, the effective tax region is also [0, t U −R ). In addition, by comparing relative thresholds, we can obtain δ < 
APPENDIX V
Compare t U −R and t U −NR , then t U −R < t U −NR . We can obtain the tax price region t ∈ [0, t U −R ) where two cases with the active and inactive constraint conditions both coexist. Compare t R and t NR , then t NR < t R . So we can divide the region 0 ≤ t < t U −R into three parts, which are 0 ≤ t < t RN , t RN ≤ t ≤ t R and t R < t < t U −R , respectively. q(t) in t ∈ [0, t RN ) is the equilibrium quantity of the case R with inactive constraint condition minus that of the case RN with inactive constraint condition. We can obtain q n (t) = 
is the equilibrium quantity of the case R with inactive constraint condition minus that of the case RN with active constraint condition. For the new product, we can obtain q n (t) =
q n (t) = 0 has a unique root value t a in the region [t RN , t R ], which is t a = . When t > t a , q n (t) < 0, otherwise, q n (t) > 0. On the other hand, q n (t)| t=t RN > 0 and q n (t)| t=t R < 0. In conclusion, when t RN ≤ t ≤ t a , q n (t) > 0, and when t a < t ≤ t R , q n (t) < 0. For the remanufactured product, we can obtain q r (t) =
. The first-order derivative ∂ q r (t) ∂t < 0. On the other hand, q r (t)| t=t RN < 0 and q r (t)| t=t R < 0. In conclusion, q r (t) < 0 in t ∈ [t RN , t R ].
q(t) in t ∈ [t R , t U −R ) is the equilibrium quantity of the case R with active constraint condition minus that of the case RN with active constraint condition. We can obtain q n (t) = − δρt 2αρ(ρ+2)+2 < 0 and q r (t) = − Proposition 5 can be proved.
Proposition 6 can be proved.
APPENDIX VII
The proof of Proposition 7 is as same as that of Proposition 5. E(t) in t ∈ [0, t RN ) is the environmental impact of the case R with inactive constraint condition minus that of the case RN with inactive constraint condition. We can obtain E(t) = E(t) in t ∈ (t R , t U −R ) is the environmental impact of the case R with active constraint condition minus that of the case RN with active constraint condition. We can obtain E(t) = − δρt(δρ+1) 2αρ(ρ+2)+2 < 0. The first-order derivative
2αρ(ρ+2)+2 < 0. Proposition 7 can be proved.
APPENDIX VIII
First, we check that SW RN (t) and SW R (t) are continuous at the boundary t = t RN and t = t R , respectively.
For SW RN (t), when t > t RN , the first-and secondorder derivatives of SW RN (t) are as follows: .
Compare e RN 1 , e R 1 and e 2 , then e RN 1 < e R 1 < e 2 . Proposition 8 can be proved.
APPENDIX IX
According to proposition 8, when e < e RN 1 , the optimal tax price is 0 in model R and RN . When e RN 1 < e < e R 1 , the optimal tax price is 0 only in model R.
APPENDIX X
For SW RN (t), because .
In conclusion, when e > max{e 3 , e RN 4 }, the optimal tax price is t U −RN . For SW R (t), because . In conclusion, when e > max{e 3 , e R 4 }, the optimal tax price is t U −R . Proposition 10 can be proved.
